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Henry Kissinger, former National Security Advisor and Secretary of
State in the Nixon and Ford administrations, Nobel Peace Laureate, coMan of the Year for Time Magazine, and widely regarded "dean of
American foreign policy" is an eloquent writer. He is persuasive, avuncular,
and sometimes grandiose. His internal logic is mostly consistent and
coherent. He is perhaps one of the greatest diplomats of his generation.
Henry Kissinger is also a man of the Cold War generation. This book
reflects his latest attempt to bring meaning to the multipolar world that
has emerged around him, but it equally reflects his more general
inability to do so, as he continues to cling to notions of unipolarity with
America at the center. An unfortunate theme is Kissinger's predictable
distraction by geopolitical and geostrategic considerations that enjoyed
more relevance during his tenure in office than today.
Does America Need a Foreign Policy? is clearly a rhetorical title
intended to stir interest in what Dr. Kissinger rightly perceives as waning
American concern for international affairs. This book is designed to
offer a general stock-taking of our current situation in the world as we
move into the 21st century-hence the subtitle, Toward a Diplomacyfor
the 21st Century. While the book does not neatly outline a comprehensive
new foreign policy, package it with all the trimmings and deliver it to
Secretary of State Powell for immediate implementation, it does create a
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useful overview of U.S. interests on a region by region basis, packing a
lot of history and realpolitik (classic Kissingerian analysis) into each
punch.
Politics perhaps inevitably finds its way into Dr. Kissinger's views.
Apparently every non-economic measure that President Clinton pursued
on the world stage was ill-advised. However, once the reader learns to
identify the sleights and subtle grumblings aimed at most of America's
Clinton-era foreign policy initiatives, these can be dismissed and the
reading becomes fairly easy-going, if at times pedantic. This book has been
described as a useful primer on foreign affairs and a great introduction
for the neophyte to the subject,' and I would generally agree with that
characterization.
Chapter one poses many questions, not all of which are answered, but
all of which should logically be considered. What should America's
goals be in the world, how should it set about achieving them, and what
resources can politically be brought to bear in furtherance thereof?
What is happening to the bedrock concept of sovereignty, how do we
deal with its transformation, and when should we be willing to violate it?
America is cast as the epicenter in a unipolar world, and the overarching
issue posed is whether Washington should cast itself as an "empire" or a
"leader."
Kissinger naturally argues for the latter. Of course, in order to agree
with Kissinger's conclusion, one must first accept the premise that
America is the gravitational well in this political galaxy, around which
all things revolve. Kissinger levels a more broad-based attack against
the post-Cold War generation of U.S. leaders, "whether graduated from
the protest movements or the business schools,"2 who tend to adhere to
an inward-looking foreign policy rather than an outward-looking one.
This line of thought is borne out by merely observing the agendas
followed during both Clinton administrations up to 1998 and the first
portion of the G.W. Bush administration.
Chapter two reviews the half-century partnership between the U.S.
and Europe. Here, the author offers a brief overview of many West
European country's assets and liabilities, questions the continued
relevance of a common security policy in Europe and contemplates the
future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization without coming to a solid
resolution. Nonetheless, Kissinger does a good job of encapsulating the
I. John J. Miller, Amazon. corn EditorialReview of Does America Need a Foreign
Policy? at http:.//www.Amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/stores/detail/books/0684855674/
reviews/qid=10102-9734577-5032946/102-9734577.4032946 (last visited March 27,
2002).
2. HENRY KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN Poucy? TOWARD ADiPLoMAcY
FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 30 (2001).
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issues and paring them down to the essential policy tensions.
Perhaps most interesting, if also inconclusive, is the discussion about
Germany's emergence in Europe after reunification. The undertones
here take on the debate of whether it is the destiny of Europe to become
more "German" or the destiny of Germany to become more "European. 3
The political, economic and demographic data tend to support a hypothesis
that each will occur simultaneously-thereby ameliorating the longterms effects of the other.
The portion of this chapter dedicated to discussing the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty of 1972 was unabashedly geared toward boosting
President Bush's initiative to do away with that agreement in the interest
of pursuing newer missile technologies and defensive strategies against
debatable "enemies" of dubious existence or capacity.4 This initiative
has now been accomplished with Russian President Putin's acquiescence
in allowing the ABM treaty to lapse,5 but it remains ironic that it was
created when Kissinger was Nixon's National Security Advisor-a
move he argues that he never supported.6
Finally, the matter of Russia is raised, though not adequately explored
-for an analysis of relations with Russia could run at least a chapter,
here they are given a mere ten pages. Dr. Kissinger portrays Russia as
unsure of itself or its place in the world, nervous, dangerous, delicate
and security-obsessed. If nations can exude personality traits, then he
finds them, perhaps in a romanticist manner, with regard to Russia, and
contends that they can drive policy in Moscow:
One of the key challenges to the relations of the Atlantic nations with Russia
is whether Russia can be induced to modify its traditional definition of security.
Given its historical experiences, Russia is bound to have a special concern for
security around its vast periphery and... the West needs to be careful not to
extend its integrated military system too close to Russia's borders. But, equally,
the West has an obligation to induce Russia to abandon its quest for the
domination of its neighbors. If Russia becomes comfortable in its present
borders, its relations with the outside world should rapidly improve. But if
reform produces a strengthened Russia returning to a policy of hegemony-as,
in effect, most of its neighbors fear-Cold War-style tensions would inevitably
reappear.

3.
4.

Id. at 37-41.
Michael J. Kelly, Editorial, As Treaty Goes, So Goes World's Security,
LANSING STATE JOURNAL, June 14, 2001, at 12A.
5. Jim Hoagland, Editorial, Strategic Odd Couple, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2002, at
B7.
6. KISSINGER, supra note 3, at 66-67.

The United States and its allies need to define two priorities in their Russia
policy. One is to see to it that Russia's voice is respectfully heard in the
emerging international system-and great care must be taken to give Russia a
feeling of participation .... At the same time, the United States and its allies
must stress-against all their inclinations-that
their concerns with the balance
7
of power did not end with the Cold War.

Kissinger turns his attention to the Western Hemisphere and Latin
America in chapter three. Ever in pursuit of balance in world power
distribution, he suggests that the best counterweight to Europe's eventual
unification is dogged pursuit of closer economic integration in the
Americas along the lines of NAFTA. Although his portrait of Argentina
as a success story now rings hollow, at least in the short term,8 his basic
argument along the lines of economic integration could prove prescient
as a means to buttress democracy and stability on this side of the
Atlantic.
Chapter four addresses American interests in Asia, but significantly
reduces these considerations to an overall policy of equilibrium cast as
something approaching containment. I do not mean "containment" in the
Cold-War sense of Truman-era policy directed toward containing
communist countries, but rather in the sense of offsetting the emergence
of any single power by boosting another to achieve balance. Only in an
Asia, where power is balanced, Kissinger contends, will economic
expansion ensue and peace be perpetuated. 9 Once an imbalance occurs,
calamity could be unleashed. The key to maintaining a status quo, of
sorts, centers on America's ability to shore up Japan as its pivotal
strategic partner in the area. 10
Of course, no foreign policy discussion about Asia would be complete
without reference to the impasse between mainland China and Taiwan.
Kissinger does not disappoint. In fact, he correctly characterizes the
increasingly common problem with Chinese stances on Taiwan and
other matters as issues of nationalism, not communism. However, his
only advice on sensitive topics where emotions run high on both sides
(here he draws a comparison between Taiwan and Palestine) is to leave
them alone until they are "ready" to be resolved.' Unfortunately, there
is not an accompanying political yardstick to measure when such a topic
becomes "ready" for resolution.
Human rights, or lack thereof, get short shrift in this chapter, which is
a shame since many of the world's human rights abuses occur in Asia.
7. Id. at 76-77.
8. Juan Forero, Across Latin America, Pityfor Argentina, and Worries Too, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2002, at A3.
9. KISSINGER, supra note 3, at 160-63.
10. Id. at 126-27.
11.
Id.at 152.
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Another major omission, especially in light of the September 11th
terrorist attacks, is any discussion at all of Afghanistan, the impact of the
Taliban regime, or the growing role of Islamism in much of Asia.
Clearly, Kissinger cannot be expected to have predicted the attacks, the
war or its aftermath. But equally clearly, he can be expected to have
considered the importance of the post-Soviet regime in that country, its
characterization of a world religion, attempts to export fundamentalism
and its larger impact on Central Asia.
The Middle-East and Africa are collapsed together in chapter five
under the neatly contrived heading of "worlds in transition." If this is
the key element these regions have in common, then it is an artificial
one. In my view, both regions are so utterly important to U.S. foreign
policy that each deserves individual treatment. Moreover, Kissinger's
inclusion of Africa as an after-thought (only ten pages) 12 handily
unmasks him as belonging to that school of thought whereby some
weight was accorded the continent when we were squaring off against
the Soviet Union, but no weight is accorded it now that the Cold War is
finished. Thus, Africa's diminished importance is reflected by its
diminished presence on the Kissinger radar screen.
In contrast, his treatment of the Middle-East is both realistic and
cautious. Kissinger dryly notes that there will be no peace between
Israel and the Palestinians until both sides want it badly enough. He also
correctly blames former president Clinton for rushing the process that
ultimately fell apart, while simultaneously crediting Ehud Barak with the
courage to make concessions no other Israeli prime minister was ever
willing to make and condemning Yassir Arafat for his inability to seize
the moment. Beyond this, his summary of that conflict holds nothing
new for the student of international relations.
However, his treatment of Iran does offer new analysis coupled with
interesting policy suggestions:
There are few nations in the world with which the United States has less reason
to quarrel or more compatible interests than Iran .... There is no American
geopolitical motivation for hostility between Iran and the United States ....
The chief obstacle has been the [ayatollah-based regime] in Tehran ....

While

there is little doubt that [President] Khatami is seeking to implement more moderate
domestic policies in the face of considerable resistance, there is little evidence
so far that this moderation extends to the international scene or that 13Khatami
will be permitted to execute a change of course if he were to attempt it.
12.
13.

Id. at 200-10.
Id. at 196-99.

Kissinger's proposed response to a positive signal from Tehran is to
"designate a trusted representative---or 'unofficial' trusted spokesmanto explore [the possibilities]. ' 4 Kissinger's suggestion proved prescient5
on this point. Iran vaguely indicated its interest in a dialogue with us.'
Coincidentally, the replacement of the Taliban regime in neighboring
Afghanistan with an interim government indebted to America for its
very existence presents us with just such a man to broker a dialogue,
although his job was not made easier by a recent slip in our diplomatic
verbiage.
It must be remembered that the law of unintended consequences is
harsh at times and benevolent at others; however, it is always operative
with respect to U.S. foreign policy. Many unintended consequences
have flowed from our involvement in Afghanistan, but the emergence of
that country's interim leader, Hamid Karzai, as a possible "third man"
smoothing over relations between America and Iran is a surprising, and
benevolent consequence.
The diplomatic dance between Iran and the U.S. during the past two
years has not been a predictable waltz, but rather a convoluted tangowith lots of sudden reversals. Until President Bush's State of the Union
address, this dance was on the whole fruitful. Limited token trade
resumed (we were once again importing Iranian pistachios and caviar),
Tehran agreed to provide safety to downed U.S. pilots in the Afghan
war, and John Ashcroft's Justice Department intervened in federal court
to dismiss a case by the former hostages of 1979-80 for monetary
damages against Iran in restitution for their unlawful detention.16
While the road to reconciliation was an unsure one, we were indeed on
it. Then the State Department lost control of the situation. Mr. Bush's
political triumvirate, Karl Rove, Ari Fleischer, and Karen Hughes, had
engineered what they considered a knock-out speech to Congress. But
with their limited foreign policy experience, they failed to detect the
landmine phrase "axis of evil" as applied to North Korea, Iraq and-yes
-Iran. 17 In one brief moment, with the president's unknowing utterance
of this label, two years' worth of initiative and investment were undone.
Colin Powell must have winced as he sat listening to the speech, his
mind racing with the implications.
14.
15.
9,2001,
16.

Id. at 200.
Nazila Fathi, On the Sly, Iran Weighs Closer Ties with U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
at Al 1.
Elaine Sciolino & Neil A. Lewis, Iran Dances a 'Ballet' with U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 200 1, at B 1.
17. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address to Joint Session of
Congress, 38 Weekly Comp. Prs. Doc. 133, 135 (Jan. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/pdbrowse.html.
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Iran was suddenly transformed back into a single evil entity from the
multi-dimensional one we had cultivated. Ayatollah Khameni and his
hard-liners had won over President Khatami and his supporters of
Western engagement. Afghanistan's Hamid Karzai was in the audience
that night, and surely understood how that sound bite would play in
Tehran. He could have easily predicted the anti-American demonstrations in
the streets and the re-ignited hatred and distrust of the U.S. that Khameni
would surely try to inflame.
So it was, that one month later Karzai went to Tehran and visited
Khatami (on his own?), not only to thank him for Iran's support, but also
to urge reconciliation with the West-especially America. Of course,
Karzai can only win from a renewed rapprochement, as can both the
antagonists. The only loser would be the Ayatollah, whose power would
erode from closer ties between his country and the U.S. Iran has
pledged $560 million to the rebuilding of its Afghan neighbor and is
eager to cement political and economic ties with Kabul. 18 America is
also invested in re-establishing Afghanistan as a stable keystone in that
turbulent area and securing it as a more dependable and predictable
friend than the other states around it have proved to be.
Perhaps these shared goals in regard to Afghanistan naturally led to
Karzai's emergence as the third man in the diplomatic dance. A
godsend to the State Department in its effort to contain and repair the
damage, Mr. Karzai is an ideal proxy ambassador. He clearly owes his
position and his country's freedom to American intervention, but he is
also a devout Muslim and military commander who fought the
Taliban-a common enemy of Tehran. So this is not Tony Blair or
Jacques Chirac showing up on Iran's doorstep in a pinstripe suit on our
behalf, but Hamid Karzai, weary from the battlefield-a man of the
region in Afghan robes and lamb-skin cap, who is willing to pay homage
at Khomeini's tomb in order to get what he wants.
We should support him in these efforts, but not overtly. If he is seen
as the stooge of Washington, taking instructions by e-mail, then his
credibility is lost and the effort is hopeless. The best thing President
Bush can do is place the delicate matter of Iran back where it belongs,
squarely in the State Department, and muzzle his White House politicos
from attempting to make political hay out of strong but misguided

18.

N.Y.

Nazila Fathi, In Tehran Visit, Karzai Appeals to Iran and U.S. to Make Up,

TIMES,

Feb. 25, 2002, at A13.

foreign policy statements. In short, if we take Dr. Kissinger's advice
and let this third man join the dance, then perhaps we can persuade the
band to keep playing.
Kissinger is less provident in his treatment of the effects of globalization.
In chapter six, Kissinger departs from his region-by-region appraisal and
delves into topical issues newly raised on the international agenda. He
provides a good summation of globalization as a process and does
identify some of the manifest downsides to this process, but the analysis
offers little by way of solutions to the growing problem of disenfranchisement.
We are advised that a "political construction" must accompany
globalization, but we are left guessing as to what this means.
Chapter seven continues the departure from regional discussion and
enters the realm of peace and justice. On the peace side, special consideration
is dedicated to what Kissinger calls the "new interventionism." By this
he means the evolving American policy to militarily violate other states'
sovereignty in order to protect human rights. It is no surprise that he
generally opposes such interventionism:
The new doctrine of humanitarian intervention asserts that humane
convictions are so integral a part of the American tradition that both treasure
and, in the extreme, lives must be risked to vindicate them anywhere in the
world. No other nation has ever advanced such goals, which risk maneuvering
the United States and its allies into the role of world policemen. 19

In his zeal to debunk what he considers unnecessary and perhaps
reckless "Wilsonianism," Dr. Kissinger overstates the case.
An
accompanying premise implicit in the new "doctrine" (if it has indeed
gelled into one) is that America will only intervene where it is possible
or desirable to do so. We did not intervene to protect against egregious
human rights abuses in Russia on behalf of Chechnya or China on behalf
of Tibet because it was not militarily feasible. Likewise, we did not
intervene in Mexico on behalf of Indians in Chiapas or Turkey on behalf
of Kurds because these are friends-Mexico a NAFTA partner and
Turkey a NATO ally. 20 Thus, there are clearly definable and pragmatic
limits to intervening "anywhere in the world."
Four examples are given, ostensibly to demonstrate this doctrine in
action, through which Kissinger draws lines of commonality to support
his argument:
The American military was deployed in Somalia, initially to help distribute
food, then to bring about civilian government; in Haiti, in order to free the

19.

KISSINGER,

supra note 3, at 253.

20. Michael J. Kelly, Traveling the Road to Rambouillet: Is the Imposition of
Federalism in Kosovo Pragmatic Foreign Policy or Unwise Meddling?, 40 S. TEx. L.
REV. 789, 799-800 (Summer 1999).
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population from a military government having come to power by a coup; in
Bosnia, to force an end to a cruel civil war; and, in Kosovo, in effect, to shift
authority from Serbia to the majority of the population, which was ethnically
Albanian.
All four cases of military intervention.. . had certain common features:
they reflected no traditional notion of American national interest... ; they were
a response to powerful domestic pressures to alleviate undisputed human
suffering...; the intervention was thought to be free of risk .... 21

The problem with Kissinger's grouping on this point is the diversity in
the degree of sovereignty allegedly violated. In the case of Somalia,
there was no functioning government in Mogadishu and in the case of
Bosnia, the West was invited by President Izetbegovic to intervene.
Moreover, these actions were not unilateral ones. The interventions in
Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia were approved by the United Nations Security
Council. In contrast, the deployment following the air campaign in
Serbia to prevent genocide in Kosovo, while done without U.N.
approval, was undertaken by NATO as a whole. Thus, portrayal of these
situations as unilateralist police actions binding us in the future to
deployment of American soldiers abroad is stretching the argument.
On the justice side of chapter seven, Kissinger engages in more
debunking as he rails against the application of universal jurisdiction of
courts to prosecute international criminals. It is this portion of the book
that suffers from a complete lack of credibility. First, because the facts
are incorrect in his argument and second, because Kissinger is
personally wanted in several jurisdictions to testify as to his knowledge
of certain atrocities.
To begin with, the author attempts to undermine the legitimacy of universal
jurisdiction as a principle of law by characterizing it as a new concept:
In less than a decade, an unprecedented concept has emerged to submit
international politics to judicial procedures .... The doctrine of universal
jurisdiction asserts that there are crimes so heinous that their perpetrators should
not be able to escape justice by invoking doctrines of sovereignty .... The very
concept of universal jurisdiction is of recent vintage. The sixth edition of
Black's Law
Dictionary, published in 1990, does not contain even an entry for
22
the term.

True, Black's Law Dictionary does not contain such an entry.
However, had his research continued beyond the dictionary to prove the
existence of this concept, Dr. Kissinger would have found its consistent
21.
22.

supra note 3, at 255.
Id. at 273-74.
KISSINGER,

usage, including by the faculty of his own alma mater, from at least
1935. Manley 0. Hudson, director of the International Law Project at
Harvard University from 1932-35, later Judge on the Permanent
International Court of Justice in The Hague, and his team of research
colleagues, lists it specifically as one of the five traditional bases of
criminal jurisdiction for courts to assert in international law:
These five general p'rinciples are: first, the territorial principle, determining
jurisdiction by reference to the place where the offence is committed; second,
the nationality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the
nationality... of the person committing the offense; third, the protective
principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the national interest injured
by the offence; fourth, the universality principle, determining jurisdiction by
reference to the custody of the person committing the offence; and fifth, the
passive personality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the
nationality ... of the person injured by the offence .... The fourth [universality
principle] is widely though by no means universally accepted .... 23

This principle has been restated as a legitimate basis for assertion of
jurisdiction in subsequent authoritative works such as the Restatement of
Foreign Relations.24 Many courts have availed themselves of universal
jurisdiction to try perpetrators of particularly heinous crimes even
though there was either no nexus, or only a tenuous one, to the country
in which the court was situated. Examples include, the trials of Adolf
Eichmann in 1961 by Israel (a state which did not exist when the crimes
were committed) for war crimes,25 Fawaz Yuniz in 1988 by the United
States for hijacking a passenger jet,26 and two Catholic nuns in 2001 by
Belgium for the commission of genocide in Rwanda. 27 Consequently,
not only is the concept of universal jurisdiction a much older theory than
Black's Law Dictionary leads Dr. Kissinger to believe, it has been used
repeatedly-even by U.S. courts.
The second dent in the credibility of this book's attack on universal
jurisdiction stems from Kissinger's very personal stake in not having it
applied to him. Christopher Hitchens, a British journalist, has compiled
23. Manley 0. Hudson, Research in InternationalLaw Under the Auspices of the
Faculty of the HarvardLaw School: Jurisdictionwith Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L
L. 1,435, 445 (Supp. 1935) (emphasis added).
24. "A state has jurisdiction... for certain offenses recognized by the community
of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of
aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even where none of
the bases of jurisdiction indicated in §402 is present." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 (1986).

25. Attorney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R., 18 (Isr. Dist. Ct. - Jerusalem
1961), aff'd, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962)
26. United States v. Fawaz Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
27. Marlise Simons, Human Rights Cases Begin to Flood into Belgian Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2001, at A8.
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a catalogue of indictable crimes against humanity allegedly committed
by Kissinger during his time in office, from his participation in mass
killings in Cambodia, Bangladesh and Timor to engineering the bloody
coup of Augusto Pinochet in Chile.28 Likewise, Kissinger has been
served with orders to appear in court in France, Argentina and Chile to
testify as to his role in various atrocities. 9 It is unlikely that those
judges will see him in their courtrooms voluntarily.3 °
The final argument against buying into Kissinger's strenuous assault
on universal jurisdiction comes in the wake of the September 1 1 th
terrorist attacks. Those terrorist acts were so universally condemned that
almost any government, were it to capture al Quaeda or Taliban
members on the run, would be predisposed to prosecute them in their
own courts even if their nationals were not killed and they did not have
extradition agreements with the U.S. For instance, Pakistan or Iran is
likely to find such people, unlikely to negotiate an extradition agreement
with America quickly, and could avail themselves of the universal
principle to try them.
Would that not be preferable to letting them go? Perhaps Kissinger
would agree given the events that have transpired since the publication
of his book. At a minimum, the persistence of universal jurisdiction as a
viable doctrine to arrest and prosecute such individuals should be
considered one more tool in the varied foreign policy toolbox of
countries as they struggle to fight the scourge of terrorism.
Finally, chapter seven concludes by denouncing the effort to establish
an International Criminal Court. Here again, Kissinger seems overly
concerned with such a court's jurisdictional reach and the types of
crimes it may consider from a personal perspective. In reality, this court
will be created within a very few years when the treaty establishing it
enters into force. President Clinton signed the Statute of Rome, as it is
28.
29.

(2001).
Nick Cohen, Book Review, Evasive Manoeuvres: Henry Kissinger is Quick to
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Rail Against Tyrants, but Completely Oblivious to His Own Guilt, GUARDIAN (London),

Sept. 9, 2001, at 17.
30. Vivienne Walt, European Prosecutors Target Foreign Human-Rights
Violators, NEWSDAY, July 16, 2001, at A4:

Paris-The invitation for Henry Kissinger that arrived at the Ritz Hotel here in
late May was not the usual request for his attendance at an elegant dinner.
Rather, a French judge wanted him for questioning about U.S. involvement
during Gen. Augusto Pinochet's rule in Chile in the 1970s, while Kissinger
was U.S. secretary of state and opponents of the Chilean strongman were
regularly 'disappeared.' Kissinger quietly checked out and left town.

but president Bush is predisposed to avoid
known, before leaving office,
31
Senate.
the
by
ratification
Nonetheless, the court may still exercise jurisdiction over U.S.
nationals who come within its purview. 32 Given Kissinger's realpolitik
stance on so many issues, it is mildly surprising that, given the court's
impending birth as a foregone conclusion, he considers it unwise for us
to become a party to it, contribute judges and prosecutors to its ranks and
attempt to reform it from within.
In his discussion of justice matters, Kissinger expresses a fear of
sovereignty erosion as a common underlying concern with regard to both
universal jurisdiction and the creation of an International Criminal
Court. That last point cannot be discounted so easily and deserves more
thorough theoretical exposition than is possible in this book review.
Ultimately, a balance must be struck between traditional notions of
sovereignty and the pursuit of uniform and enforceable justice.
The book's Conclusion contains several thought-provoking observations,
my favorite of which is the apt comparison between the computer's
ability to reshape global society today with the impact of the printing
press reshaping the medieval world. Where the computer, and all the
potential it represents, will take us is anyone's guess, but we are sure to
be transformed as people and countries, thus also transforming the
personal and international relations that flow therefrom.
Kissinger rightly praises president Bush's call for America to act with
humility on the world stage. After an era of triumphalism and arrogance
that characterized our conduct of foreign policy in the 1980's and 90's,
with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright memorably referring to
America as "the indispensable nation," a tone of humility is clearly in
order. 33 More so now that some of the hatred aimed at this country can
be traced to such callousness felt in the Islamic World and the Third
World.34 Although much of this book's impact may have been
undermined by the unforeseeable terrorist attacks against us, these final
thoughts remain salient, and may in fact prove the most precious to
emerge from this work.
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